PILGRIMAGE AND THE SPACE OF DREAMS

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Dorothy Richardson’s ‘A Sculptor of Dreams’, published in The Adelphi in October 1924, was a review-essay of Mary Arnold-Forster’s (Mrs H.O. Arnold-Forster’s) Studies in Dreams, which had appeared in 1921. Richardson’s discussion of the book fell into two parts: the first a consideration of Arnold-Forster’s accounts of dreams and dreaming and the second an account of Richardson’s own model of good dreaming or, more precisely, good dreamlessness. My focus in this essay is also two-fold, looking both at Richardson’s responses to Studies in Dreams and at the place or space of dreams in Pilgrimage.

For Richardson, Arnold-Forster’s text posed the question, ‘To dream, or not to dream’, though, Richardson noted, this was a query that the author, ‘herself a born dreamer’, neglected, assuming in her readers the same full dream-life that she herself enjoyed. Situating herself among those who do not dream, or whose dreams are so infrequent that they may be called those who do not dream, Richardson turned her attention to the ‘man of many dreams’, for whom Studies in Dreams would create a particular dilemma. Arnold-Forster’s study, which explored the possibilities of ‘dream control’, and the cultivation of ‘the art of happy dreaming’, had, Richardson argued ‘achieved nothing less than the destruction of the dream as a free booter and its reconstruction as a controllable human faculty’. The dreamer was thus left, Richardson suggested, with an uncomfortable choice: ‘once aware not only that he may influence the material of which his dreams are built, [he] must either accept a discipline or turn away to sorrowful possession of his disorderly wealth’. What he could no longer do is ‘regard dreams as the uncontrollable antics of his unknown self’. Arnold-Forster was, in Richardson’s words, ‘of those who are, so to say, permanently conscious, thinking as they

go, all the time in words’, and this ‘permanently conscious thought’ was revealed nowhere more clearly than in her attitude towards ‘wandering thought, a state of mind she regards as possible only quite rarely, and then only as spree or experiment’. We can begin to see how radically opposed Richardson would be to Arnold-Forster’s conceptions of thought and consciousness, though her review was not a strongly critical one. It expressed less intellectual disagreement than the gulf that exists between, as she framed it, the dreamer and the one who does not dream.

Richardson alluded to, but did not address directly, the deep hostility to Freudian dream-theory, and its sexual and symbolic underpinnings, motivating Studies in Dreams. As Arnold-Forster argued:

Nightmares and dreams of fear exist, other ugly and evil imaginings may also be hidden away out of sight, and all these conceptions, side by side with our uncounted half-forgotten memories of fair and happy things, are set free when the will that controls them is wholly or partially suspended at night. But I believe that not only are these sinister visions and interpretations exaggerated, but I shall also hope to show that, in sleep, we are not, or need never be, left at their mercy, because we can if we choose exercise a real and effective control over the nature of our dreams.2

The question of ‘dream control’ did not, Arnold-Forster argued, ‘come within the scope of other books’, and Richardson followed her in this claim when she argued that Studies in Dreams had, albeit unwittingly, created havoc in the fabric of up-to-date ideas on the subject of dreams.

In fact, however, Arnold-Forster’s text is part of an established tradition of writing on the concept and practice of ‘directed dreaming’, whose most recent manifestation is ‘lucid dreaming’, sometimes defined as ‘dreaming with awareness’. Some

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contemporary writers on the topic suggest that ‘lucid dreams’ might be used to practise or perfect our imperfect skills - a spot of oneiric car-mechanics, perhaps - giving a whole new meaning to the term ‘night school’. All writings on ‘lucid dreaming’ will spend considerable time on lucid dreaming techniques, and the promotion of awareness of the dream state and dream control, which apparently comes only with considerable practice. Techniques include waking oneself at regular intervals in order to recall dreams and to write them down; and prolonging or stabilising lucid dreams, usually through forms of spatial orientation. The current doyen of lucid dreaming, the sleep researcher Stephen LaBerge, proposed the now favoured technique of Dream Spinning:

As soon as the visual imagery of your lucid dream begins to fade, quickly, before the feel of your dream body evaporates, stretch out your arms and spin like a top (with your dream body, of course). It doesn’t matter whether you pirouette, or spin like a top, dervish, child or bottle, as long as you vividly feel your dream body in motion. This is not the same as imagining you are spinning: for the technique to work, you must feel the vivid sensation of spinning.3

The longer history of ‘directed dreaming’ includes such texts and movements as the dream-experiments of Alfred Maury, described in his Sleep and Dreams of 1861. This was closely followed by the anonymously published study by the Marquis d’Hervey de Saint-Denys, Les rêves et les moyens de les diriger (Dreams and How to Guide Them) of 1867. Freud’s dream-diaries, kept from the 1880s, were a foundation for The Interpretation of Dreams, itself a text in which autobiography becomes a method. Late nineteenth-century novelists also had a particular fascination with dream-states, particularly in their relation to concepts of double or dual consciousness. In the 1910s and 20s, and in part as a direct outcome of the First World War, there was an increased interest not only in dreams but more particularly in pre-cognitive and

directed dreaming, as in J.W. Dunne’s extremely influential *An Experiment in Time* (1927). The history of dream-recording should also, of course, include Surrealist auto-experiments in dreaming, in particular those of Breton, Desnos and Crevel. Mass-Observation, the ‘anthropology of ourselves’ founded in England in the 1930s, was strongly influenced by Surrealism, and one of its central activities, emerging out of war-consciousness and the kind of dreams brought about by war-time existence, was the study of dreams. Mass- Observers were asked to keep records of their own dreams and nightmares, and of ‘dominant images’ in dreams. In all these instances, dreaming became a ‘project’.

**Directed Dreaming**

Hervey de Saint-Denys (b. 1822), an aristocrat who became a Professor of Chinese at the Collège de France, described his childhood passions as those of dreaming and drawing, passions he combined by starting to keep, when he was 13, a regular diary of his dreams, which ran to 22 notebooks filled with coloured illustrations covering a period of more than 5 years of dreams. His project was to develop his skills as a dreamer. *Les rêves et les moyens de les diriger* was both an exploration of what Freud would later call the dream-work and a guide to directed dreaming. Again anticipating Freud, Hervey gave accounts of dream-images and dream-mechanisms in terms recognizable as those of condensation, displacement and secondary revision, and there is a similar sense of the incorporation into the dream of the ‘day’s residues’, though he explicitly linked this to the fact that his attentiveness to his dreams, his practice of ‘analyzing and describing them during the day, meant that they, as elements of my ordinary intellectual life, came to form part of the body of reminiscences my mind could draw upon while I was asleep’. The next step was to fix his attention in his dreams ‘on particular

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details which interested me, so that on waking I might have a more clearly defined memory of them’.

The emphasis on ‘attention’ in Hervey’s text brings it into the frame of the late nineteenth-century psychology of attention. It was not until the later nineteenth century that ‘lucid’ or ‘directed’ dreaming was firmly tied in to the ‘disciplinary’ aspects of attentiveness: in Jonathan Crary’s words, ‘a repressive … defense against all potentially disruptive forms of free association’.5 There may be a hint of this, however, in Hervey’s contrast between the lucidity of deep dream-sleep and the ‘transitory period between waking and sleeping in which anarchy reigns among our ideas and confusion among the images representing them’.6

Hervey practised elaborate and idiosyncratic experiments in controlling his dreams by introducing sensations. He frequently drew comparisons between dream-consciousness and dreaming and the new optical instruments and technologies of his time - particularly the camera, the photograph and the magic-lantern. His dreams also represented and often had the qualities of prints or engravings, and dream-awareness consisted substantially in the close observation of visual and architectural detail within the dream. Hervey most often explored dream-attention as a question of focus. If a dream-landscape began to fade, signalling that sleep was becoming less deep, the dream could be continued and the intensity of sleep regained, by the concentration of attention on one of the small objects whose image still remains - the leaf of a tree for instance. This image will gradually regain the clarity has lost, and you will see the vividness and colour of the shapes gradually re-established, just as if you were focusing the image from a lantern slide in a darkened room.7

If the dreamer wished to change the dream-scene, it was suggested that he put his hand over his eyes in the dream to cut off vision.

6 Dreams and How to Guide Them, op. cit, p.63.
7 Ibid, p.49.
There is a complex relationship between what Hervey called ‘the moving panorama of our visions’ and the stasis of the photographic image which operated for him as an analogy for memory and dream-consciousness. Recurrent images of train-travelling, associated with reverie, and city perambulations, were a further aspect of his desire to put (still) visual images into motion. It was imagination, he suggested, that gave to memory the ability to turn a ‘two-dimensional stationary picture’ into ‘a moving, living figure’.8 At two different points in the text, he offered accounts of the ways in which the ‘capricious mutations’ within dreams were captured by a caricaturist, Grandville, who ‘drew a series of outlines in which a pirouetting dancer turned into a frantically whirling bobbin. This phenomenon occurred particularly in moments of greatest passivity, in which the mind rested, as if seated in a theatre, watching distractedly, as a series of images of greater or lesser clarity passes before its eye’.9 At a later point in the text Hervey referred to the occurrence in a dream of ‘the spectacle of two superimposed images, the one appearing fixed and solid, the other moving and transparent’.10 There are proleptic hints here of Freud’s preoccupation with the co-existence of the permanent and the mutable, of the retentive and receptive surfaces of the mental apparatus, but my primary interest here is in the interplay of, and the border or boundary-crossing between, stasis and motion, as well as that between waking and dreaming in the discourses of controlled or directed dreaming.

In a chapter on ‘Transformations and Transitions in Dreams’, Hervey described a dream-experiment involving the reading of passages from Ovid’s Metamorphoses: those in which Proteus’ daughters are changed by Venus into stone, as a punishment for their denial of her divinity and for their prostituting themselves, and Pygmalion’s creation of the statue of a woman which Venus brings to life. Hervey painted the scene of enlivenment or vivification while keeping a piece of orris-root in his mouth. He then arranged for this substance to be passed between his lips as

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10 Ibid, p.137.
he slept, and dreamed of being in a theatre with an actress from the Comedie Française, and of Miss X, scantily attired: ‘How do you like me like this?’ she asked, coming towards me …’. The route of associations Hervey traced were formulations of a dream-work, with an interplay of primary and secondary ideas.

In the Ovidian structure of Hervey’s dream-experiments, that which is animate, mobile - the daughters of Proteus - is turned to stone - while Pygmalian’s stone statue is animated into life and motion. This interplay or exchange between the animate and the inanimate was repeated in a further experiment involving a Chinese album which Hervey possessed, showing a series ‘of palaces, countrysides and more or less fantastic scenes’ and numerous human figures. He studied the paintings closely while sniffing some powdered flowers - ‘an oriental product with a particularly distinctive scent’. The scent was then administered while he slept. His dreams on these occasions took one of two forms. On three occasions, he saw some of the subjects of the Chinese album in movement. On two occasions, ‘by a somewhat remarkable process of reversal’ he saw ‘real scenes, friends or acquaintances’, appearing not in the guise of real objects, ‘but in the form of a collection of engravings and watercolours, lifeless and two-dimensional’.12

By taking their own dreams as examples and paradigms, Maury and Hervey inaugurated a tradition of dreaming as auto-experimentation, which became central to Freud’s work on dreams. Freud’s dream-diaries, kept from the 1880s, were a foundation for The Interpretation of Dreams. While at one level the concept of lucid, controlled or directed dreaming would seem to be antithetical to Freudian dream-theory, with its emphasis on dreams as a highly encoded message from psychic regions inaccessible to consciousness, Freud’s letters to Wilhelm Fliess recount the progress of his self-analysis as a process which transgresses the boundaries between waking and sleeping:

For the last four days my self-analysis ... has continued in my dreams and has presented me with the most valuable elucidations and clues. At certain points I have the feeling of being at the end, and so far I have always known where the next dream-night would continue.\textsuperscript{13}

As J. B. Pontalis writes: 'for a certain time [Freud] literally made appointments with his dreams and, even more astonishingly, his dreams kept the appointments'.\textsuperscript{14} When Fliess suggested that Freud leave out the account of one of his dreams from the dream book, Freud complied with regret, asking Fliess to ‘Let me know at least which topic it was to which you took exception ... So that I can omit what you designate in a substitute dream, because I can have dreams like that to order.’\textsuperscript{15}

The structure and the narrative drive of \textit{The Interpretation of Dreams} makes the text itself into a kind of directed dream. Hervey sought to show that will and attention are to be found in dreams, and thus that dreams could be directed, by an account of a dream in which he saw himself riding on horseback to a fork in the road which appears before him: ‘The right-hand path disappears into a thick wood, the left-hand path leads to some sort of ruined manor house. I feel at liberty to turn either right or left, and therefore to decide for myself whether I shall evoke ideas and images relating to the ruins or to the wood’.\textsuperscript{16} Freud wrote to Fliess that \textit{The Interpretation of Dreams} ‘is planned on the model of an imaginary walk. First comes the dark wood ... then there is the cavernous defile ... and then, all at once, the high ground and the open prospect and the question: “Which way do you want to go?”’.\textsuperscript{17} The reader is guided through the text as a dreamer.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} \textit{The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess}, op. cit, p.315. (9 June 1898)
\item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{Dreams and How to Guide Them}, op. cit, p.53.
\item \textsuperscript{17} \textit{The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess}, op. cit, p.365. (6 August 1899)
\end{itemize}
More generally, the wish-fulfilment theory of dreams turns all dreaming into a kind of directed dreaming, an aspect of Freudian theory picked up by Sandor Ferenczi in a note on ‘Dirigible Dreams’ published in 1912. He commented on the dreams of a patient in which the transition between different scenes within a dream occurs in a motivated rather than unmotivated way - the dreamer reporting the transition between scenes in these terms: ‘at this moment I thought to myself this is a bad dream; the dream must be solved in a different way’. In this way a change of scene could be effected in the dream, and the material, and its outcome, worked through to a satisfactory conclusion. In Ferenzi’s words:

The insight into the motives of the scene-changes in these dreams may be used in general for explaining the connexion between several dreams dreamt in the same night. The dream elaborates from all sides the particular dream thought which occupies the mind, drops one dream-scene when there is a danger that the wish-fulfilment will fail, tries a new kind of solution, and so on, until finally it succeeds in bringing about a wish-fulfilment which satisfies, with a compromise, both instances of the mind. 18

Other turn-of-the-century models of lucid or directed dreaming abounded. An imitation of Hervey’s techniques of dream-direction was practised by the Dutch psychiatrist Frederik Van Eeden, who began to use similar methods to Hervey’s to study and then to guide his dreams in 1896. He first presented his observations in the form of a novel, The Bride of Dreams, but a paper delivered at a meeting of the Society for Psychical Research described in direct terms his experiences with demon-dreams and with lucid dreams, in which he directed himself to meet dead people whom he had known in life. Hervey’s experiments may also have influenced George du Maurier’s novel 1891, Peter Ibbetson in which two separated lovers meet every night in their dreams and together explore their childhoods and the historical past, moving, as apparitions, alongside their former selves and their ancestors. This

reverberates with responses to early cinema (as La Poste wrote of the Lumière’s first screenings at the end of 1895: ‘When everyone can photograph their dear ones, no longer in a motionless form, but in their movements, their activity, their familiar gestures, with words on their lips, death will have ceased to be absolute.’), while at the same time exploring the concept of dreaming as time travel. This would be taken up by J.W. Dunne in An Experiment in Time, which used relativity theory to argue for the possibility of dreaming of future events. The method of lucid or directed dreaming was called ‘dreaming true’ in Peter Ibbetson, and was intertwined with du Maurier’s, or his narrator’s, polemics on the potential for the expansion of human consciousness through ‘dreaming true’, and for the perfectibility of the human race, usually framed in eugenicist terms. Prior to his learning ‘true dreaming’, the narrator’s sleep was ‘full of dreams’:

Terrible nightmares, exquisite visions, strange scenes full of inexplicable reminiscence; all vague and incoherent, like all men’s dreams that have hitherto been; for I had not yet learned how to dream.

A vast world, a dread and beautiful chaos, an ever-changing kaleidoscope of life, too shadowy and dim to leave an lasting impression on the busy waking mind; with here and there more vivid images of terror or delight, that one remembered for a few hours with a strange wonder and questioning, as Coleridge remembered his Abyssinian maid who played upon the dulcimer…

But there is one thing which, as a schoolboy, I never dreamed - namely, that I, and one other holding a torch, should one day, by common consent, find our happiness in exploring these mysterious caverns of the brain; and should lay the foundations of order where only misrule had been before; and out of all those unreal, waste, and transitory realms of illusion, evolve a real, stable, and habitable world, which all who run may reach.20

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The passage is indicative of the ways in which the late nineteenth-century utopia of ‘lucid’ or ‘directed’ dreaming became a way of channelling Romantic vision, turning misrule into order. The kaleidoscope image is also significant, for it occurred with marked frequency in the writings of nineteenth-century writers on dream psychology, where, as for du Maurier, it represented a disordered and chaotic visual regime. ‘Dreaming true’, ‘lucid dreaming’, in Peter Ibbetson, was analogized by the camera obscura on Ramsgate pier: ‘one goes in and find one’s self in total darkness; the eye is prepared; one is thoroughly expectant and wide-awake. Suddenly there flashes on the sight the moving picture of the port and all the life therein, and the houses and cliffs beyond; and farther still the green hills, the white clouds, and blue sky’ - and by an image of the unconscious memory as the product of a brain which contains ‘something akin both to a photographic plate and a phonographic cylinder, and many other things of the same kind not yet discovered; not a sight or a sound or a smell is lost; not a taste or a feeling or an emotion’.21 Mind and memory, as well as the new technologies, were thus imaged as storage systems.

Robert Louis Stevenson’s dream-life, which he described in an article entitled ‘A Chapter on Dreams’, published in Scribner’s Magazine in January 1888, is a variant on directed dreaming, with Stevenson’s claim to use the help of his ‘little people’ or ‘brownies’ as collaborators in the writing of his novels. Opening his account by describing his own experiences in the third person before he claims them as his own - a strategy of doubling central to Stevenson’s fictions, to his authorial collaborations (as with his stepson Lloyd Osbourne), and to the structures of dreaming itself - Stevenson wrote:

When he lay down to prepare himself for sleep, he no longer sought amusement, but printable and profitable tales; and after he had dozed off in his box-seat, his little people [the ‘brownies’] continued their evolutions with the same mercantile designs. All other forms of dream deserted him

21 Ibid., p.198, p.208.
but two: he still occasionally reads the most delightful books, he still visits at times the most delightful places; and it is perhaps worthy of note that in these same places, and to one in particular, he returns at intervals of months and years, finding new field-paths, visiting new neighbours, beholding that happy valley under new effects of noon and dawn and sunset. But all the rest of the family of visions is quite lost to him: the common, mangled version of yesterday’s affairs, the raw-head-and-bloody-bones nightmare, rumoured to be the child of toasted cheese - these and their like are gone; and, for the most part, whether awake or asleep, he is simply occupied - he or his little people - in consciously making stories for the market.22

As in Peter Ibbetson, this passage from Stevenson implied the vanquishing of the fierce dreams of Romanticism. ‘The raw-head-and-bloody-bones nightmare’, in Stevenson’s phrase, was to be mastered by the strategies of controlled or directed dreaming, even as Stevenson created his own fictional nightmares. Here we see the use of the concept of the dream to define a shift from the notion of literature as inspiration, possession, to the practice, proscribed by Coleridge in Biographia Literaria, of pursuing literature as a trade. More precisely, Stevenson was suggesting that the possessing agents - his ‘brownies’ - could be profitably harnessed to the means of production. This would become the basis for the argument Arnold-Forster had with the writings of Henri Bergson in Studies in Dreams: Bergson claimed that Stevenson was not truly dreaming, because he had not withdrawn ‘interest’ from the world, whereas for Arnold-Forster Stevenson’s was in fact the truest form of dreaming.

The narratives of ‘directed dreaming’ at the turn of the century were rarely far removed from those of mediumship and indeed spiritualism, as in the dream-experiments of Frederick Myers. In Andrew Lang’s study of 1897, ‘dreams’ and ‘ghosts’ were readily conjoined, in his title and his thought. The alleged events of ghostdom - apparitions of all sorts - are precisely identical with the

every-night phenomena of dreaming, except for the avowed element of sleep in dreams’, Lang wrote. He added: ‘In dreams, time and space may be annihilated, and two severed lovers may be made happy...the comparatively rare cases in which two or more waking people are alleged to have seen the same “ghost”, simultaneously or in succession, have their parallel in sleep, where two or more persons simultaneously dream the same dream’.23 Peter Ibbetson would seem to underlie much of this discussion. The phrase ‘time and space may be annihilated’ is also striking: we find it and its variants time and again in discussions of the phenomena of late nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernity - in particular new forms of communication, such as wireless telegraphy, train-travel and the emergent art of the cinema - suggesting that the dream-apparatus might also be perceived as one of the technologies of modernity.

In the 1910s and 1920s, and in part as a direct response to the First World War, there was an increased interest not only in dreams but more particularly in pre-cognitive and directed dreaming. Dunne, in his An Experiment in Time, was interested in the crossing of boundaries between past and future in the dream, and he set out to prove ‘that dreams - dreams in general, all dreams, everybody’s dreams - were composed of images of past experience and images of future experience blended together in approximately equal proportions’. The effect, he argued, ‘was one which was apparent only to definitely directed observation, and its failure to attract general attention was, thus, sufficiently explained’.24 Arnold-Forster’s Studies in Dreams explored in particular war-dreams in which the author as dreamer redirected the course of events, and argued, as we have seen, that will, morality, and judgement are all fully operative in dream-consciousness. The question of the desire for controlled or directed dreaming as a response to war trauma was a particularly significant aspect of Studies in Dreams and raised for Arnold-Forster...

the central question of whether the mind, waking or sleeping, could ever be fully disengaged - or ‘disinterested’ in the terms Henri Bergson used to describe the dream-state - during states of emergency such as war-time, an issue also at the heart of the Mass-Observation dream-diaries.

‘A Sculptor of Dreams’

There are aspects of Arnold-Forster’s *Studies in Dreams*, above and beyond the question of controlled dreaming, which might have been expected to interest or engage Richardson more fully than they appear to have done. For example, Arnold-Forster was particularly caught up with the question of flying or gliding in dreams, and highly enthusiastic about the flying-costume that she often wore in her dreams. This she described as a ‘flying dress’ of ‘straight close folds which fall three or four inches below my feet’ so that they could not be seen as she glided just above the surface of the streets: ‘no one can see now that I am not walking just as they are’.25 Dream-costumes aside, such forms of ‘hovering’ surely find their echo in *Pilgrimage*, as do Arnold-Forster’s preoccupations - close to those of Havelock Ellis and Henri Bergson in their studies of dreams - with transitional states between sleeping and waking, with the intensely visual, cinematographic aspects of the dream state, and, perhaps above all, with the question of time and narrative in dreaming and in the recollection of dreams. As Arnold-Forster writes: ‘The dream should first be allowed to unroll itself very quietly backwards in a series of slowly moving pictures, starting from the end and going back slowly through scene after scene to its beginning, until the whole dream has been seen’.26

In ‘A Sculptor of Dreams’ Richardson expressed a strong resistance to the willed recall of dreams, as to dreaming in general: ‘There is, for me, not only no attraction in the art of dreaming, but an aversion so strong that I am aware, while a dream is in progress, of an annoyed sense of being derailed, of wasting time. Most

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25 *Studies in Dreams*, op. cit, pp.74-5.
26 Ibid, p.79.
certainly I do not wish to learn to dream.’ She particularly resisted the idea of the ‘necessity of spending the wakening moments of each morning in recalling and noting down the features of the night’s dream’. This would be, in her phrase, a ‘morning sacrifice’, and it is not too difficult, if one has a knowledge of Pilgrimage, and its relationship to the space-time of the day, to comprehend why Richardson would express a resentment of the use of the day in the service of the night (as opposed to sleep serving to renew the self for the day). Yet Arnold-Forster’s account of dream-recollection as the unrolling of the dream into the past, and the focus throughout her text on what she calls ‘borderland states’ would not seem, on the surface, to be radically opposed to the experience which Richardson proffers as her model of ideal dreaming (or non-dreaming) She recounted, in ‘A Sculptor of Dreams’, an experience of waking from deep sleep, ‘profund slumber’:

\[\text{to find myself, there is no other way, to put it, busily alive in the past, and at the same time onlooker at myself living…As actor, my known self…was living through whole strands of life, not in succession, but as it were all in one piece…and was at the same time aware of the inquisitor presenting them, sharing the life and making judgements…with a gaiety bordering on amusement and enchanting altogether.}\]

The nightly task of perfect sleep, she suggested (in ways that echo early twentieth-century time-philosophies, and in particular concepts of ‘tensed’ and ‘untensed’ time in the writings of the British Idealist philosopher John McTaggart) might be ‘a direct consideration of things as they are, undisturbed by the sense of time and place, and sometimes of an undisturbed consideration of all that we are. Not a review, as one reviews life in memory, but a current possession, from a single point of consciousness, of our whole experience intact, and a consequent arrangement of the immediate future’. This account of ‘perfect sleep’, it should be said, might also define her project in the thirteen volumes of Pilgrimage, both in relation to time and experience and to the doubled self.
Richardson’s biographer Gloria Fromm, in her discussion of ‘A Sculptor of Dreams’, argued that ‘what Dorothy Richardson was describing was an experience of profound consciousness - such as might come to a psychoanalyst turned upon himself and purified of all resistance - a sense of staggering self-sufficiency’. 27 Joanne Winning extends this reading, arguing that the two selves represented in the dream, the one existing in the past and the other in the present, echo the split between the writing self and the recreated self, Miriam Henderson. The pleasure of the experience Richardson described in the essay derived from the sense that neither the past self, nor the past, was lost. The journey in the dream seems, in Winning’s words, ‘to be the analytic one that she refuses to make “in waking life” because of the pain and the terror of it. This dream is memorable for the emotional resolution it provides - the union of her two selves; and the realization that her past self remains alive in the past brings about “healing blows”’. 28

This analysis convinces, both as an account of the dream-experience and of the project of Pilgrimage more broadly. We might also, however, situate the dream-experience less as a form of, or substitute for, psychoanalysis, than in the general context of early twentieth-century dream-theories, and in particular those of Bergson.

Richardson’s experience is differentiated most fully from Arnold-Forster’s ‘directed dreaming’ not by its divorce from a form of ‘work’ - Richardson referred to the ‘nightly task’ of sleep - but through its lack of susceptibility to will and control. It is revealed in progress only by an accident, by a wakening that must not be the product of ‘noise or any other warning disturbance’. It arose, Richardson wrote, out of a state of ‘profound slumber’. This last phrase was that used in the English translation (published in 1913/14) of Bergson’s essay Dreams, in which he differentiated between the kind of dreams that might work through or over what

Freud had called the day’s residues, arising from the events about ‘which we have thought most distractedly’, in Bergson’s words, and those that emerge ‘in very profound slumber’ in which ‘the law that regulates the reappearance of memories may be very different’:

We know almost nothing of this slumber. The dreams which fill it are, as a general rule, the dreams which we forget. Sometimes, nevertheless, we recover something of them. And then it is a very peculiar feeling, strange, indescribable, that we experience. It seems to us that we have returned from afar in space and afar in time. These are doubtless very old scenes, scenes of youth and infancy that we live over then in all their details, with a mood which colours them with that fresh sensation of infancy and youth that we seek vainly to revive when awake.  

Whereas Freud found something new and something old in all dreams, Bergson divided dreams into two classes - ordinary dreams, arising from distracted thoughts, ‘which do not bear the mark of effort’, and the dreams arising from ‘profound slumber’ which suggest to him not only the mechanisms of unconscious memory but ‘the more mysterious phenomena which are raised by “psychical research”’, more particularly telepathy. As with Freud’s invocation of the ‘navel’ of that dream, that point beyond which interpretation cannot go, Bergson stops ‘upon the threshold of the mystery’.  

Richardson, I would suggest, was uninterested in dreaming as the processing of the day’s residues; that material which has barely caught waking attention but that has attached itself, as it were, round the edges. For Freud, Ellis and Bergson, these residues are often represented as the by-products of the life of the street and the fleeting aspects of urban modernity. The completeness of Miriam’s day in Pilgrimage and the quality of her attention to it - which does not preclude ‘wandering consciousness’ - seems to

leave no such ‘residues’. Richardson was instead drawn, it would seem, to Bergson’s second category of dreams: not the ‘ordinary’ dream but that brought about in and by ‘profound slumber’.

These speculations can be tested by a turn to the representation of sleep and dreams in Pilgrimage itself. There are only two narrative or narrated dreams in the whole of Pilgrimage, the first occurring on the opening pages of Pointed Roofs, when Miriam, waking on the morning of her departure for Germany, recalls that she has been dreaming about the unwelcome reception she would receive from the women there: ‘She had dreamed that she had been standing in a room in the German school and the staff had crowded round her, looking at her. They had dreadful eyes’ (I 21). The second dream occurs at the close of Honeycomb, when Miriam is with her mother at the seaside, just before her mother’s suicide. Her mother’s sleeplessness is at one with the weight of the night which produces the dream rather than healing sleep: Miriam ‘dreamed she was in the small music-room in the old Putney school, hovering invisible’ (I 184). Her friend Lilla plays the piano, first ‘steadily and vigorously’, and then in ‘a blur of wrong notes’. ‘Miriam rejoiced in her heart. What a fiend I am’. She is woken from the dream, into the darkness and ‘the unbroken sleeplessness of the room’, by the sound of her mother ‘sighing harshly’ (I 185).

Is Miriam, then, like her creator, so infrequent a dreamer as to count as one who does not dream? In fact, we are told (or Miriam tells others) of her recurrent dreams, though the text rarely narrates them, most of them linked to memories of the childhood garden - where they become merged with the ‘bee-memory’ -

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32 The dream is rendered open to analysis through the terms that the text has already offered. Lilla has been differentiated by Miriam from those dreadful, smiling women she encounters elsewhere, and an identification with her has been made explicit. The text has also described Miriam’s ‘masculine’ style of piano-playing and her large hands. Just before the dream, she has found a new way of playing the piano to soothe her mother, ‘carefully avoiding pressure and emphasis … She had a clear sense of manhood’ (I 471).
and/or to exile from the garden: ‘I often dream I am there [in the garden at Abingdon] and wake there, and for a few minutes I could draw the house … and I feel then as if going away were still to come, an awful thing that had never happened’, Miriam tells Michael Shatov (III 124). In Revolving Lights, Miriam remembers the last summer of her school-days, ‘a sunlit flower-filled world opening before her…To that other world she was still going forward. One day she would suddenly come upon it, as she did in her dreams’ (III 334-5). McTaggart’s philosophy is invoked in this part of the novel-sequence: the blending of past experience and images of future experience further anticipates Dunne’s An Experiment in Time, in which he sought for a way to break down, in thought and dream, the barrier which divides our knowledge of the past from our knowledge of the future.

In Pointed Roofs, Miriam awakens into stillness after a terrible storm, becoming aware of ‘the faint scent of her soap-tablet’ - linked at other times to the fragrance of the remembered garden: ‘She felt that her short sleep must have been perfect … She remembered that she had dreamed her favourite dream - floating through clouds and above tree-tops and villages …. She had almost brushed the tree-tops, that had been the happiest moment …. She stirred …. ‘It’s me’, she said, and smiled (I 149-50). Self-possession is thus closely linked to ‘perfect’ sleep and the ‘favourite dream’.

The other class of sleep- or dream-states in Pilgrimage come closest to the experience Richardson recounted in ‘A Sculptor of Dreams’ and they are linked to sleeping ‘out of place’ or ‘out of time’: that is, to sleeping outside and/or to sleeping during the day. In The Tunnel, Miriam spends a day by the sea with Jan and Mag during which they fall asleep at the foot of the cliffs. Miriam is awoken by the shouting of a group of boys: ‘Waking in the daytime is perfect happiness. To wake suddenly and fully, nowhere; in Paradise; and then to see sharply with large clear strong eyes the things you were looking at when you fell asleep…She closed her eyes and drifted drowsily back to the moment of being awakened by the sudden cry…In the instant before her mind had slid back…she had been perfectly alive, seeing; perfect things all round her, no beginning or ending…the moment she had just lived was the same, it was
exactly the same as the first one she could remember, the moment of standing, alone, in bright sunlight on a narrow gravel path in the garden at Babington between two banks of flowers, the flowers level with her face, and large bees swinging slowly to and fro...It was the same moment’ (II 212-3). Here the experience recounted in ‘A Sculptor of Dreams’ is identified with the first memory.

In Dawn’s Left Hand, Miriam’s attempt to describe Amabel to Hypo Wilson is interrupted, in the narrative, by a passage in which she recalls a Sunday morning spent together with Amabel, after an evening at Mrs Bellamy’s gathering, where she and Amabel ‘suddenly met and were both filled with the same longing, to get away and lie side by side in the darkness describing and talking it all over until sleep should come without any interval of going off into the seclusion of our separate minds’. In the morning,

I leaned my head back and for a few seconds was asleep for the first time in broad daylight, and woke so thoroughly refreshed that I said without thinking: ‘This is the birthday of the world,’ and, while she flew to fling herself down at my knees, I was back in the moment of seeing for the first time those flower-beds and banks of flowers blazing in the morning sunlight ... And I told her of it and that it must have been somewhere near my third birthday, and her falling tears of joy and sympathy promised that never again should there be in my blood an unconquerable fever. (IV 243)

These two episodes of sleeping in the daylight, in the company of another woman or women, have their counterpoint and contrast in Revolving Lights, in which Miriam, staying at the Wilsons’, sleeps out at night in the garden with Alma and Hypo. As Hypo, ‘sleepily’, tries to discourage Miriam from talking, she thinks: ‘There was to be no time of being out in the night with him. He was too far off...They were all more separated than in their separate rooms indoors...She lay waiting for the night to turn to night’. But, she discovers, ‘There is no night...Day, not night, is forgetfulness of time. Its movement is a dream. Only in its noise is real silence and peace. This awful stillness is made of sound; the sound of time,
pouring itself out; ceaselessly winding off short strips of life, each life a strip of ceaseless light, so much, no more, lessening all the time’. This, then, is time passing - and the model is one of subtraction rather than accumulation. ‘Night is torment’, Miriam thinks. ‘That is why people go to sleep’ (III 357-8)

The significance of these three scenes of ‘extraordinary’ sleep - sleep during the daytime, sleep (or sleeplessness) in the outdoors at night - is twofold: they are ways of realizing sleep, and, because they are about sleeping in the company of others, ‘shared’ sleep, the ‘absence of division’ between night and day, in the terms posed at the close of ‘March Moonlight’ (III 648) is, potentially, an absence of division between self and other. ‘Perfect sleep’ thus embodies both ‘the utopia of individualism’ (which Stephen Heath sees as the heart of Pilgrimage) and the possibility of absolute relationship, and it is inextricably intertwined, in The Tunnel and in Dawn’s Left Hand, with the relationship between women. The episode in Revolving Lights points in a different direction - the presence of Hypo (and Alma) Wilson renders Miriam more isolated, not less, and she realizes not healing sleep but the night and the entropic dimensions of time and the universe. The sound of time is ‘a harsh hissing sigh, far away; gone’ which is at one level the sound of ‘the unconscious sea’ but also seems to recall the ‘sighing harshly’ of Miriam’s sleepless mother on the night before her death and her conviction of her ‘desertion’. When sleep comes to Miriam, lying on the Wilson’s lawn, it is ‘angry sleep leading direct to this open of morning’: ‘Alma, folded in her dressing-gown, disappearing into the house. The tumbled empty bed on the lawn, white in the open stare of the morning. Everything that happened seemed to be a conspiracy to display emptiness’ (III 359). This is a form of desolation, a pitilessness, and an absence of reciprocity in which the ‘open stare’ countenances no returning look, with echoes of To the Lighthouse, and of Lily Briscoe’s empty canvas, ‘with its uncompromising white stare’. The scenes of sleep and dream in Pilgrimage thus lead to the extremes of experience: to both the ecstasy of being and back to ‘the horror that had wrenched her life in twain’.
So far I have discussed the ways in which sleep and dreams are thematised in *Pilgrimage*. But the question of the ‘space’ of dreams in Richardson’s text is also one of narrative structure and of the representation of narrative time. At times the text represents the space between the end of one day and the beginning of the next as a break rather than a transition: at other times Richardson represents the extension of the day through the broken flow of consciousness before sleep. On occasion, there is a resistance to sleep, not, as Freud suggested, because of the ego’s fear of its dreams, but because ‘She loved the day that had gone; and the one that was coming’. Between the end of Chapter 4 and the beginning of Chapter 5 of *Deadlock*, the white space of the page is the space of the night. Miriam has discovered writing and on the little table in the window-space of her room the ‘paper-scattered lamplit circle was established as the centre of life’. The chapter closes with the table ‘free and untouched’. The next chapter opens: ‘The spell of the ink-stained table had survived the night’ (III 135). Here the space of the night is not occluded, but the focus is on the continued existence of the desire for writing, embodied and embedded in the little table, through the night, as if there had indeed been a danger that it would not survive the night but would have been dispelled and dispersed in the space between the days.

In *Oberland*, there is a more radical representation of continuity between the end of one day and the beginning of the next. Chapter 2 ends with Miriam born down ‘into the uttermost depths of sleep’: ‘From which’, Chapter 3 begins, ‘she awoke in light that seemed for a moment to be beyond the confines of the earth. It was as if all her life she had travelled towards this radiance, and was now within it, clear of the past, at an ultimate destination’ (IV 49). The sentence carries on over the space of the night, in an interlude in *Pilgrimage* in which the world is so given over to light that night has lost even the power of interruption.

Where, in conclusion, is the space of dreams in *Pilgrimage*? Richardson’s work could clearly be situated alongside those other modernist texts to which sleep and dreams are central: Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse*, Joyce’s *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* and, perhaps above all, Proust’s *A la recherche*. These writers were caught up with
the borders or boundaries between sleeping and waking, as in Walter Benjamin’s focus on threshold arena of awakening, and his preoccupations with situations of reduced attention or half-wakefulness. Whereas, however, the self for Proust is radically dispersed in and by sleep, having to be reconstituted, everyday, for Richardson it is renewed, as sleep renews the day.

The question of the space of dreams is, of course, also linked to the representation of the night in Pilgrimage, at its fullest in The Trap, which contains much of the night, and in which Miriam’s dislike of Selina Holland comes to centre on her obliviousness to the world of the night in Flaxman’s Court. It is not so much that Miss Holland sleeps through its disturbances as that she is oblivious both to her own unconsciousness of them and of the world of the night through which she sleeps.

Maurice Blanchot’s short essay ‘Sleep, Night’ (included in his The Space of Literature) takes us a little further into these issues and representations. Blanchot differentiates between sleep and dream, which is ‘closer than sleep to the nocturnal region. In the night one cannot sleep…this interminable “day” is the approach of time’s absence, the threat of the outside where the world lacks’. In contrast, Blanchot writes: ‘By means of sleep, day uses night to blot out the night. Sleep belongs to the world; it is a task’. We recall here Richardson’s invocation, in ‘The Sculptor of Dreams’, of the ‘nightly task’ of ‘perfect sleep’. ‘You must sleep’, Blanchot writes: ‘this is the watchword which consciousness assigns itself, and this commandment to renounce the day is one of day’s first rules’. Whereas ‘Bergson saw behind sleep the totality of conscious life minus the effort of concentration’, Blanchot argues:

myself...The meaning of sleep lies precisely in its being vigilant existence concentrating upon certitude...so that the morning’s newness can welcome it and a new day can begin.34

It is in very similar terms that I see the representation of, and relationship between, sleep, dream, night and day in Pilgrimage. The question might also be raised, however, of whether some of the qualities of dream-life explored in this article - the role of urban phantasmagoria, the interplay of stasis and movement, the annihilation of time and space - might not also connect more closely to waking consciousness in Pilgrimage and the space of the day. The yet broader issue is whether Pilgrimage, with its interplay between first and third person, understood in psychoanalytic terms as the very structure of fantasy and dream, its ‘penetration’ of space and its mode of narration interminable, should in fact be understood as a dream text tout court.

34 Ibid, p.266.